10.   Justice Lofchik?s order can be set aside for ignoring pleadings in claims discussed in motion hearing for the Tort of Deceit (CT 149-155, 242-43, 868-889) and Constitutional Tort (CT 240, 244-249, 251, 253-324 disability ground, 323-39, 349-89, 404-07, 567-79--89, 609-611) as there is no analysis per endorsement paras #4 and #51 for these causes of actions which means they were sufficiently pleaded.  The Tort of Deceit is per factum para #71 and includes: verbal and written positive misrepresentations one being the Code?s preamble ?everyone is equal? and sections 5 to 10 and HR cases for prima facie complaints; and the second that my complaints were being ?investigated? fairly to mislead me; when there was no fair investigation of every fact which has to include complainant?s witnesses and prima facie collaborative evidence from respondents in reports and JR weighing all the evidence and facts per Ruckpaul JR case;  and the Crown defendants knew I would act upon my rights per the Code resulting in damages. 

The Constitutional Tort is per motion factum #66, HVK and Longley cases that includes:  breaching the Charter, UN Treaty, and the Code per public policy of ?everyone in Ontario is equal? with measures to codify section 5 to 10 and HR case laws not save under section 1 of the Charter; and Queen/MAG?s refusal to provide a non-discriminatory Human Rights process which the law requires including JR appeals; discrimination per Charter with differential treatment and retaliation by dismissing prima facie complaints  with intentional flawed investigation tactics of all facts in HR complaints to fabricate insufficient evidence in case analyses pleaded in claim 04 matter such as paras 17, 26, 28, 29, 32 (facts at para #36 to #142), and 33, and similarly for 05 matter, and JR Appeals; and additional motive of reprisal for suit #1178/04 filed in Spring against OHRC and Intake Staff before December 2004 reports.  The fact ?unfit to work had I return? in MMP?s case analysis at para #30 is libel and disability discriminatory statement not bald assertion and sufficient for suit per internal report cases at para #6 above.  The Crown defendants have lost jurisdiction and immunity, and can be sued civilly for breaching the Code?s preamble objective per intentional torts with no pleadings of negligence in claim (CT 81, 123, 132, 134-35, 156-62, 195-197, 206-216):

         ?the tort of deceit involves a false statement of fact made by the defendant directly to the plaintiff.  This positive misrepresentation can be in either verbal or written form. In the leading case on the tort of deceit Derry v. Peek, the deceit was contained in a company?s written prospectus.? 

         ?the defendants were liable for fraud based upon ?active non-disclosure.?

?Transit told the media that Dixon was dismissed after a performance review.  That statement was deliberately misleading because it failed to say that it was after a performance review that failed to disclose any cause for dismissal.?

        ?Secondly, the Charter may be infringed, not by the legislation itself, but by the actions of a delegated decision-maker in applying it.  In such cases, the legislation remains valid, but a remedy for the unconstitutional action may be sought pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter.? 

?In R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, Lamer C.J.C. set out the fundamental approach to s. 15(1) at p. 922 as follows:  The court must first determine whether the claimant has shown that one of the four basic equality rights has been denied (i.e. equality before the law, equality under the law, equal protection of the law and equal benefit of the law).?

        ??an adjudicator exercising delegated powers does not have the power to make an order that would result in an infringement of the Charter, and he exceeds his jurisdiction if he does so.? 

?the Charter applies and that, ?A Society  and a social worker preparing a Society?s case are obvious instruments of government within the meaning of subsection 32(1).  In my view, a children?s aid society is an arm of the state and where there are breaches of the charter by the Society, it may be held responsible.  Actions of directors or employees as agents of the society are, therefore, subject to scrutiny under the Charter.?

Justice Lofchik?s endorsement record paras 4, 51, and 54, Affidavit of Plaintiff, Claims 04-13797 (paras 22, 27, 26, 28, 29, 32, and 33) and 05-18300 (4, 15, 30, 33, 36, 40, and 41), Motion Factum, CT (See above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6

Klar, supra, pages 601, 603, 605, Book of Authorities, Tab 13

Dixon v. British Columbia Transit (1995), 9 B.C.L.R. (3d), front page, paras 37, 39, 40, 41, 58, 66, 69, and 76-81, Book of Authority, Tab 8

Longley v. Minister of Revenue SCC case and (Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, paras 82, 83, 92-95, 97-100, 108- 109, 115-117, 135-37, and 141, Book of Authorities, Tab 16

H.V.K., supra, page 2 para 2, para 32, Book of Authorities, Tab 10

11.  Justice Lofchik?s order can be set aside for fettering discretion as there is no absolute immunity per Westlake, White and Smith for the Commission a Crown Agency under control of MAG per section 27 of the Code when in suit for possessing powers contrary to Code?s purpose ?everyone in Ontario is equal? with personal staff of OHRC, it is only immune if sued by its self in its own rightper Smith and Starline (CT pgs 63-88-91-99, 327-30).  The Court errored that Starline dismiss Major and Commission for absolute immunity per Westlake or that Major had shared immunity with Commission when they were dismissed for failure to serve notice to Crown (CT 88-91, 100-09, 110-112).  Justice Lofchik affirms in his endorsement record paras #45-#54 that I pleaded ?they acted

deliberately? with ?quality of the investigation? of unlawful conduct of staff selecting only facts and evidence unfairly with bias to Employers in the reports and not investigating or including all the facts per HR law and refusing to provide me with their evidence into 2010 with improper purpose to discriminate and defame and breach Natural Justice in Bad Faith with malice that  declines jusisdiction per Ruckpaul and Cashin, and for collatoral advantage (CT 142, 162, 194-97). 

These are questions of motive prompting these Crown Defendants to act as they did for improper purpose to breach natural justice and statute (CT 296-306, 345) and is a question of fact per intentional torts not negligence with no special immunities to be determined at a Trial not Rule 21 motion per SCC?s decision in Roncarrelli, Berardinelli, Nelles, Starline and other cases per factum arguments at paras #35 to #79 (CT 95-328), the UN Treaty and section 5(2) and 23 of the Proceedings Against the Crown.  These authorities give right to sue for intentional conduct with other improper motives of collusion, discrimination and defamation with respondents that is contrary to public purpose in Code?s preamble, section 36, and Charter which invalidates Justice Lofchik?s argument at #49 and #50 base on Lacosse and Oren Nimelman and JR when my claims are not similar (CT 206-207, 234-36, 572-73, 592-99, 603-05, 626-27, 640-49, 706, 745-48) per the following:   

        ?The Commission is responsible to the Minister for the administration of this Act.?

?All provincial and federal human rights legislation is relevant to the interpretation of one human rights statute.?

        ?Instead, the courts examine the relationship between that body and the Crown, as represented by the ministers of the Crown.  If that relationship is one of control by a   minister, then the controlled body is an agent of the Crown.?

  ?Section 5 of the Public Authorities Protection Act makes it clear that the Crown can be liable in tort if its servants or agents have committed a tort.  It is also clear that Crown agencies are included under the Act.? 

        ?public bodies must not use their powers for purposes incompatible with the purposes envisaged by the statutes?

      ?It would appear on the basis of the authorities cited that, in general terms public   officers are entitled to no special immunities or privileges when they act beyond the powers which are accorded to them by law in their official capacities.  It would follow, then, that where a public officer, a servant for the Crown exceeds the powers of his office or acts improperly in fraud of his duties and powers, or acts with malice in the discharge of his duties, he does not have immunity from civil suit and where, by reason of such excess of power or improper motive, he causes damage he may be civilly liable in damages.  This, indeed, seems clear as far at least as it may concern public servants who act in administrative capacities.?

      ?should be resolved in favour of the person whose right of action is being truncated?

       ?proceeding in tort in respect of such act or omission may be brought against that servant or agent or the personal representatitve of the servant or agent.?

       ?23.  Where this Act conflicts with any other Act, this Act governs?

        ?To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or enterprise.?

        ?serious and obvious errors also oust jusidiction and hence remove the immunity?

 ?The Court allows Cashin?s application and refers the matter back to the  Canadian Human Rights Commission because Cashin was not afforded the   opportunity to know the specific evidence against her and to answer it.  The  Court finds that the requirements of natural justice were not met.?

?its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.?

?There was no need for giving a notice of action as required by art. 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the act done by the defendant was quite beyond the scope of any function or duty committed to him?

The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, pgs preamble, 1, 2, 43, 53, 58-60, 62-64, 67, 68, 74, 140-42, 146, 149, 172, 184, 191, 201, 302, 359, 361, 447, 448, and 468; and The 2009 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, pg 2 and 3, Book of Authorities, Tab 2

Starline Entertainment Centre Inc. v. Ciccarelli, supra, pg 1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 16, Book of Authorites, Tab 22

Crown Agency Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.48

Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, ss. 1, 5 (1) and (2), and 23

UN Treaty, surpa, Article 2 (e), Book of Authority, Tab 25

Klar, supra, pg 289, Book of Authority, Tab 13

Roseann Cashin v. Canadian Human Rights Commission (1984), 5 C.H.H.R. D/2234, paras summary, 18875-78, Book of Authority, Tab 4

Ruckpaul v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC149 (CanLII), analysis pgs 7 to 11 particularly paras 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52-58, 62-71 and 75, Book of Authorities, Tab 20

Roncarelli, supra, pgs 123, 140, 141-43, 155-59, 167, 169, and 184-86, Book of Authorities, Tab 19

Statement of Claim 04-13797 para #24, Motion Factum 04 matter paras #35-43 (42 JR), and 44-79, CT (See above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tabs 3, 4, and 6

12.  Justice Lofchik?s order can be set aside for error in law at his paras #30, #45, #51-54, #57, #62 and #66 alleging: 1) that complainants do not have right to thorough investigation of all facts (CT pgs 754-68) or suit for improper purpose of breach of statute with unlawful discretion without authority or intent of Code; 2) that ?obstruction of justice? and ?breach of natural justice? were pleaded as causes of actions in themselves rather than to support torts (CT pgs 258-261, 296-99, 605-607, 620-25, 706); and (3) that my pleadings for intentional torts that includes words of deliberate conduct of fabrication of insufficient evidence, sham investigation, slanting the case analysis, distorting and imaging the truth, controlling witnesses, concealing evidence, colluding, defaming, ?targeted malice?, obstruction of justice and breach of Code is the law of negligence, can only be question through a JR, are inflamatory and not allowed when they are appropriate words to plead for deliberate conduct per conspiracy cases of Chahal, SCC case of Hunt and others.  The pleadings at para #20 in 2004 claim denote unlawful and bad faith conduct equated with dishonesty for refusal to acknowledge prima facie facts and evidence sufficient for improper purpose for abuse of office per SCC cases of Roncarelli and Longley, Ruckpaul at para #8 above and HVK case para #56, and is not negligently  making innocent mistake.  I pleaded them as the deliberate and improper conduct for the cause of action of Misfeasance of Public Office (Ct pgs 124-189-224, 232-393, 394-407, 408-420, 789), Discrimination and other intentional torts (CT pgs 135-37, 163-64, 640-49, 779-889) allowed per Odhavji similar to breach of statute (CT pg 394).  

Justice Lofchik agrees that I pleaded the intentional torts per his para #51 and #54 with ?they acted deliberately?; and he intentionally ignores my pleadings with motives at para 20 in 04 matter and para #6 and #31 in 05 matter that I had filed suit against commission and intake staff #1178/04 in Spring 2004 and received case analyses in December 2004 sufficient for reprisal and collateral advantage motive, and campaign to induce mental illness of delusional disorder and/or depression which are sufficient pleadings per intentional tort law (CT 704-729, 754-68, 793-818).  Justice Lofchik is breaching the authority of SCC cases of Roncarelli and Longley similar to mine in that the Crown knowingly misleads complainant as to the legality of prima facie complaints by fabricating insufficient evidence in case analyses, and I pleaded at para #24 ?targeted malice? with reckless disregard for the truth (CT 877-878) per Uni-Jet all sufficient per motion factum para #47 to #79 that allows suits against the Crown and Justice Lofchik?s order can be set aside per the following: 

        ?I plead that the facts as stated in Shannon Meadows-Lee from the investigation office at the commission in her December 2004 MMP case analysis are injurious falsehoods and the tort of deceit from the commission colluding with now MMP Limited to protect Watts Reprisal campaign from being exposed by concealing    evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome to the facts presented in these case analyses.?

        ?The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in this statement listed from #36 to #142.?

        ?a conspiracy to injure me with a mental illness of the type of ?people out to get me?

       #20 ?fraudulently, deceitfully or negligently suppressing, distorting and

        misrepresenting the results of medical and scientific research on the disease-causing effects of asbestos.? 

        ?Just as a public officer who breaches a statute might be liable for negligence, so too might a public officer who breaches a statute be liable for misfeasance in a public office.  Saskatchewan Wheat Pool would only be relevant to this motion if the appellants had pleaded no more than a failure to discharge a statutory obligation.?

 ?In light of the allegation that the Chief?s failure to segregate the officers was delibersate, this is not a sufficient basis on which to strike the pleading.?

        ?Malice has been described as ?improper purpose?.  That it has a wider meaning than spite, ill-will or a spirit of vengeance, and includes any other improper purpose, such as to gain a private collateral advantage.?

        ?bad faith? is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with a furtive design or ill will.?  

        ?Persons exercising such quasi-judicial powers?in the absence of fraud, collusion or malice, are not liable to any civil action at the suit of any person aggrieved by their decisions.?

        ?Minister of National Revenue was liable for the tort when officials in its department knowingly misled the plaintiff by refusing to acknowledge the legality of a tax avoidance scheme that the plaintiff had concocted.  The court held that the defendant had therefore knowingly acted outside of its statutory authority where damage to the plaintiff was probable satisfying the second form of the tort.?

?Good faith? in this context?means carrying out the statute according to its intent and purpose; it means good faith in acting with a rational appreciation of that intent and purpose and not with an improper intent and alien purpose?

Statement of Claim #04-131797 paras 6-10, 13, 20-22, 24-26, 28, 30-33, 118-140, and #05-18300 paras 3, 6, 10-16, 22, 24, and 30-45, Motion Factum 04 matter para #47 to 79, and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 3, 4, and 6

Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 (S.C.C.), paras 4 (#19 and #20), 8, 9, 21, 23, 26-39, 46, 47, 52, 54 and 57, Book of Authorities, Tab 11

Odhavji, supra, para 31 and 37, Book of Authorities, Tab 17

Starline, supra, pg 12, Book of Authorities, Tab 22

The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, supra, page 302, Book of Authority, Tab 2

Roncarelli, supra, pgs 123, 140, 141-43, 155-59, 167, 169, and 184-86, Book of Authorities, Tab 19

Longley, supra, pg 446, paras 82, 83, 85, and 86, Book of Authorities, Tab 16