7.   Justice Lofchik order can be set aside as facts in HR complaints and the case analyses reports are sufficient for full particulars for all torts per Roncarelli, Ashley, Deery, Longley, Botiuk, Hunt, Deputy Judge Nairn, and rule of civil procedure 25.06 (2) and (8) and I requested adding other facts allowed per HVK with a low threshold (CT 191-94, 217, 294-99, 581, 615-20, 640-49, 737-40, 789-796).  These HR facts pleaded were allegedly investigated and have been proven in similar HR cases therefore they are not baldly pleaded.  The Charter, Code, UN treaty and SCC clearly states the Crown does have a duty to the public policy of ?everyone is equal? to proceed with every prime facie complaint in a ?non-discriminatory manner? to Tribunal per factum arguments for 04 matter at paras #47, 48, 51, 54, 57-60, 62, 63, 65-68, 70-76, 78, and 79, and similarly for 05 matter that makes all complainants equal so long as the prohibited ground forms one of the reasons such as MMP?s rebuttal ?long absense?. 

The Code and SCC cases at para #6 invalidates the Crowns section 34 cases of Way and Gismondi on discretion when complaint is prima facie made out per the Code: repetitive of sexual harassment, exposure to any form of pornography or sexual representation or sex solicitation, failure of six elements HR?s test, insurance plan that limits benefits for mental disabilities (MMP, and Lyman), firing employee without making inquiries and accommodation (MMP), perceived disability discimination, and firing after making internal complaints for reprisal.  The Crown defendants are personally suable for acting in an discriminatory manner of differential treatment by fabricating insufficient evidence refusing to look at all facts with intentional flawed investigation and JR into 2010 sufficient for improper purpose that oust jurisdiction and immunity not protected by Charter section 1 (CT 124-26, 237, 745-48, 857).  My pleadings of facts show that respondents made clear statement concerning one of the grounds which forms one of the reasons for their conduct per the code unlawfully ignored by Crown to defame me with incompentency falsehoods not baldy pleaded per Deep para 46 and the following:

      ?For example, a party might state simply that the party was defamed by the   other party without stating what the other party said that was defamatory.?

      ?A prima facie case of discrimination?is one which covers the allegations made and which, if they are believed, is complete and sufficient to justify a verdict in the complainant?s favour in the absence of an answer from the respondent employer.?     

       ?the fact that ?disability? played some role in the decision taints the entire decision.?

       ?the law is clear that the prohibitive ground of discrimination need not be the only reason for the action taken, so long as it forms one of the reasons.?

?The Tribunal holds that discrimination occurred when the sole director and officer of the respondents, Albright Drycleaners Ltd., fired Ms. Williams-Wilson without making inquiries into the status of her mental state and without giving her the chance to request accomodation.?

Rules of Civil Procedure 25.06(2)

Deep v. Ontario, {2004} O.J. No. 2734, paras 20, 22, 35, 44, 46, 57, 68, and 83, Book of Authorities, Tab 7

Starline, supra, pg 14 (25.06(8)), Book of Authorities, Tab 22

                        The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, pg 201, 43, 59 and 361, Book of Authorities, Tab 2

Margaretta Williams-Wilson v. Albright Drycleaners Ltd (1997), 32 C.H.R.R., summary paragraph, Book of Authority, Tab 27

International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 50 v. Otis Canada Inc., 2004 CanLII 49773 (ON L.R.B.), paras 47, 54, 60, 61, 62, 66, 77, and 79, Book of Authorities, Tab 12

Statement of Claims #04 paras 8 and 110, motion factum (04 matter para 27, 56, and 58), OHRC documents (showing Respondents collaborative evidence forming one of the reasons), Deputy Judge?s Nairns endorsement record for Lyman?s failed rule 21 2004 motion), and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tabs 3, 6, 7, and 10

8.  Justice Lofchik?s order can be set aside because the discretionary power to not deal with a complaint is per the Code s. 36 after an investigation not included in his bias analysis at #44 from Crown?s s. 34 case of Way in their factum at page 9 para #30 and #31 (see first quotation below) with changed words from this case (second quotation) which is intervening to favour the Crown.  The Way and Gismondi cases with duty under s. 34 to not proceed to investigations are not similar to my case and therefore is an illegitimate reason for dismissing investigated complaints under s. 36 by Crown proving intentional unlawful conduct and acting without authority.  Justice Lofchik errored in his endorsement at #60 as the Code under s. 34 and 36 does not include statement of discretion per endorsement record and Way, nor to breach stare decisis of sections 5 to 10 and Human Rights Case laws similar to my prima facie complaints, or deprived complainants of thorough and full investigation of every fact with lots of fundamental omissions explicitely disregarding facts (CT pgs 130-32, 160-63, 165-185, 199-209, 218, 263--275-286, 294-99, 345, 363-89, 393-96, 640-49, 754-768) per Odhavji a non Human Rights case not similar to my claim with HR violations; and requires non-discriminatory reason per #6 above, and JR courts to weigh the evidence and order production of investigation documents in question when challenged by complainants.  All are facts of intentional not negligent conduct by all Crown Defendants acting beyond powers of the Code?s preamble into 2010 per the following after first three quotations:

?It is respectfully submitted that the legislation clearly establishes the discretionary nature of the Commission?s powers.  In fact, the Court has recognized that the Commission is not under a public duty to proceed with every complaint placed before it.?

        ?The Commission is not under a duty to investigate every complaint?

?34. (1) (b)  the subject-matter of the complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;?

?36 (2) Notice of decision not to appoint inquiry ? Where the Commission decides not to refer the subject-matter of a complaint to the Tribunal, it shall advise the complainant and the person complained against in writing of the decision and the reasons therefore?

?its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.?

?an investigation had to be at least thorough and neutral for the Commission to have a fair basis on which to evaluate?

?that where the completeness of the investigation or report is challenged, the underlying investigation documents are relevant and subject to production?      

        ?If the investigation is flawed to the point where a court can reasonably conclude the evidence reported by the investigator is incomplete or inadequate, the court must intervene.?

?She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses.  The Commission realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant?s witnesses.?

?Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16, 2001, from CIC?s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to CIC were not disclosed.?

?Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims.  However, the investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report.  This omission might constitute a ?fundamental? omission.?

                        Affidavit of Plaintiff, Claims 04-13797 and 05-18300, Motion Factum of the Respondents pg 9 para #30 and #31, Motion Factum 04 matter paras #30 to #79, CT (see above), OHRC documents, Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7

Way v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [2003] O.J. No. 5099 (S.C.J.) at para 7, Book of Authorities, Tab 26

                       The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, supra, pgs 172, and 184,  Book of Authorities, Tab 2

Ruckpaul v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 149 (CanLII), analysis pgs 7 to 11 particularly paras 42, 45-50, 52-58, 62-71 and 75, Book of Authorities, Tab 20

9.  Justice Lofchik?s order and the Crown?s case analyses reports can be set aside for fettering discretion acting outside of their jurisdiction when their decision is inconsistent with all equality laws at paras #6 to #8 above infringing the Charter and ?access to justice? and breaches the principle of stare decisis by refusing to consider all of the appellant?s binding authority.  This includes joint tortfeasors doctrine that no judge can ignore per motion arguments that invalidates the Crown?s authorities and is intervening in hearing to favour the Crown institutional bias when MAG appoints Ontario Judges like Justice Lochik per CT ( pgs 161, 179, 218-24, 296, 323, 564, 571, 581, 588-89, 620, 749-58, 772-780, 786-87, 793, 817, 825-28, 857) and the following:

       ?A judge should not give a judgment contrary to that of another judge of the same court unless at least one of the following situations exists:  (1) subsequent decisions  have affected the validity of the impugned judgment; (2) it is shown that some  some binding authority in case law or some relevant statute was not considered;?

        ?The fundamental rule in the exercise of discretion is that the choices made must be consistent with the purpose of the statute and within its wording.?

        ?When officials rule out options that the law requires them to consider they are said said to be fettering their discretion.?

        ?If the official considering the application ignored the criteria that he was required to apply in making the decision and decided to deny access to the services, the individual might be able to successfully challenge the decision in the courts on the grounds that the official was acting outside his jurisdiction.?

        ?A tribunal may appear to have a built-in bias where one of the parties that appears before it is a government department that approves its budget, appoints its members, provides its staff, or exercises control in other ways that may suggest that the department has influence over the tribunal?s decisions.?  This kind of built-in bias is called institutional bias.?

?The kinds of activities, conduct, interests, relationships, and associations of a decision maker that may give rise to an appearance of bias includes:  intervenes in the hearing process in a way that persistently favours one party over another.?       

Justice Lofchik?s May 14^th 2008 order, Affidavit of Plaintiff, Deputy Judge Mongeon?s Endorsement Record for file #1178/04 para 21 and 28, and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 1, 2 and 10

Administrative Law:  Principals and Advocacy, pg 5, 50, 51, 54, 58, 68, 93 and 94, Book of Authorities, Tab 23