Press Release

Three of my floral paintings have been accepted for ?The Art in the Workplace? juried exhibition at McMaster Innovation Park commencing August 1, 2010. The official opening with reception is on August 26, 2010, starting at 6:30 pm and closing at 9:30 pm. The exhibition will be available for viewing at the Atrium @MIP from August 1, 2010 until November 23, 2010 during business hours (Monday to Friday, 8:30 am till 5:30 pm). Location: McMaster Innovation Park, 175 Longwood Road South, new Suite 105, Hamilton, ON, L8P 0A1, and Tel: 905-667-5507.

My Florals will be on display at CJ's Cafe In Bronte from October 5^th to November 2^nd with opening reception on October 5^th at 7:00. The Cafee is on Lakeshore Road East of Bronte Road ? look for the Orange arbour and planters which you can check it out at www.CJSCAFEINBRONTE.COM or call 905 465-0411.

Claudette will be participating at the CNE this year with a booth with Art For All of Canada Organization from August 20th ? September 6^th. She will be present at the booth on Saturday, August 28^th from 4 to 10 pm with transfer art and doodles demonstrations.

 

Claudette Losier has her doodles and transfer art entitled ?The Harvest 2010? on display from June 5^th till August in the small gallery at the Pearl Company at 16 Steven Street off of King Street 3 blocks past Victoria Street in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada. The Harvest is a combination of oil paintings, doodles and photo transfer creations of floral, portraits, figurative, animals, and strange abstracts. Please call the Gallery for hours of operation at 905-522-8735. The exhibition is open to the public.

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Check out this installation video by my two assistance who hung my transfer art. 

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Three of my floral paintings have been accepted by "The Art in the Workplace" juried exhibition at McMaster Innovation Park commencing August 1, 2010.   The exhibition will officially open with a reception on August 26, 2010, starting at 6:30PM and closing at 9:30PM.  The exhibition will be available for viewing at the Atrium @MIP from August 1, 2010 until November 23, 2010 during business hours (Monday to Friday, 8:30am till 5:30pm).   Location:  McMaster Innovation Park, 175 Longwood Road South, new Suite 105, Hamilton, ON , L8P 0A1, and Tel: 905-667-5507.

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My art has been posted on new Hamilton website promoted by Ali Bartlett to promote Arts in Hamilton. 

Claudette Losier hamilton makes art...... .....uo?l???? s???? ???: claudette losier
hamiltonmakesart.blogspot.com
immersed in the stillness within - claudette losiersoul mate - claudette losierpopping red poppies - claudette losierglowing red poppies bending towards perfection - claudette losiercourt gesture no. 2 ... Yesterday at 7:59pm... ?

Claudette Losier >http://www.facebook.com/l/07665;hamilton class=word_break>makesart.blogspot.com/

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Press Release

Claudette Losier will be exhibiting her doodles and transfer art entitled ?The Harvest 2010? from June 5^th to July 5th in the small gallery at the Pearl Company at 16 Steven Street off of King Street 3 blocks past Victoria Street in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.  The opening reception is on Saturday June 5^th 2 to 5 pm.  The Harvest is a combination of oil paintings, doodles and photo transfer creations of floral, portraits, figurative, animals, and strange abstracts.  Please call the Gallery for hours of operation at 905-522-8735.  The exhibition is open to the public.

 

?The Harvest 2010? represents the output of my growing season as an artist these past two years from gathering my ideas, seed-form, through the process of regular yoga spiritual practice, modeling for animation students influencing my work, doodling in my sketch book and snapping photos with my digital camera to reaping an abundance of output creative crops.  In 2007 I started to go back to drawing with my first few drawings being careful renderings with black pen from anatomy books and the masters DaVinci and Michelangelo.  Although I was pleased with these drawings they took a long time and they did not get me to develop the habit of drawing regularly.   So I went to a smaller sketch book, 3?X5?, which I was able to carry with me wherever I went and no longer felt precious about each drawing which started the habit of drawing regularly and 2 years later I have a nice collection of more than 15 sketch books.  I started at first using the blind contour or quick gesture techniques and later added drawing on top of the less successful doodles and going back into them by noodling them and later switching to a gel black pen.  I also purchase my first digital camera and saw the world in a new way as this technology provided me with greater capabilities for my creative image explorations.  This past year I made photo copies of these works to create my transfer art and coloured them up using left over pastels and later added acrylic inks, plus combine transfer image and oils.  My yoga practices lead me to read from all scriptures for the underlying equality and harmonizing truth in all religions, and sciences particularly physic and Nero plasticity that explained to me a new reality about the Universe that is influencing my creations.  I sing cosmic chants while creating in my studio to promote positive vibrations and now create art to promote peace and Universal love.  All of these explorative steps I took resulted in my creative outflow expending and into a more intuitive process way of working and more automatic drawing or creating full of exciting energy.  

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13. Justice Lofchik?s order can be set aside for breaching stare decisis of my authorities per my factum paras #31 to #85 per HR facts (CT pgs 777-877-899).   My pleadings are sufficient for defamation/libel tort with 2 employers? injurious falsehoods of incompetency being repeated by Crown plus falsehoods of insufficient evidence of Code violations for prima facie facts, and MAG approving it through the Appeal Courts; thus they all have made the libel per SCC case of Hill.   Lawful discretion does not protect the Crown under the Tort of Conspiracy (CT pgs 174-193, 253-290, 305-24, 420-427, 640-49, 704-729, 793-818), Defamation (CT pgs 112-118, 119-20, 154-155, 238-241, 252, 342, 742, 818-836), and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (CT pgs 397-99, 836-862-868) per my motion factum, in court arguments and the following:

        ?Any act or omission done or made by a public official in the purported performance of the functions of the office can found an action for misfeasance of public office.? 

 

       ?At the pleadings stage, it is sufficient that the statement of claim alleges that the plaintiffs have suffered mental distress, anger, depression and anxiety as a consequence of the alleged misconduct.? 

 

       ?Sekhon persisted in his unjustified allegations of the plaintiff?s misbehaviour with teachers it was a basis for terminating the plaintiff.  This according to Varner v. Morton supra, is an overt act of conspiracy.?

 

       ?The manner and the orchestration of the termination is evidence thereof as well as the defendants purpose of terminating the plaintiff on spurious causes and the defamation of the plaintiff at the May 18^th meeting and subsequent are all conduct that is tortious in itself.? 

 

       ?A second form of actionable conspiracy exists when two or more combine to injure a third person by unlawful means ? eg. the commission of a crime or tort, or the infringement of a guaranteed constitutional right?In such a case it is irrelevant that the objects of the conspirators in using those means may be legitimate?Hence a conspiracy may be actionable if either the end or the means, or both, are unlawful.?

 

       ?to do unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means?

 

       ?Mr. Hunt had suffered personal injury?suppress information the defendants had created a foreseable risk of causing harm which he in fact suffered.? 

 

       ?the violation of the right itself is sufficient injury.? 

  

?The so-called ?single publication rule? does not apply to concurrent tortfeasors, who can be defined as persons whose torts concur, or run together, to produce the same damage.?

 

?three instances:  agency, vicarious liability, and concerted action.?

 

?As set out in Hill, supra, ?if one person writes a libel, another repeats it, and a third approves what is written, they all have made the defamatory libel.?

 

?The Declaration and Report are by their terms inextricably interrelated.  By their actions, the appellants become joint tortfeasors.  Further, they, as lawyers, signed the Declaration without undertaking any investigation.  For Lawyers to act in this way constituted reckless behaviour.?

 

Odhavji, supra, para 18, 20, and 41, Book of Authorities, Tab 17

 

Chahal v. Khalsa Community School (2000), 2 C.C.E.L. (3d), paras 110-115, 118, 119, 122, and 124, Book of Authorities, Tab 5

 

Canada Cement Lafarge Ltd. v. British Columbia Lightweight Aggregate Ltd., [1983] 1 S.C.R. 452, pgs 8 to 12, Book of Authority, Tab 3

 

Hunt, supra, paras 4 (#19 and #20), 8, 9, 21, 23, 26-39, 46, 47, 52, 54 and 57, Book of Authority, Tab 11

 

Klar, supra, pgs 289, 293, 294, 601, 603, 605, 628, 636, 672, 682 and 683,Book of Authority, Tab 13

                       

Botiuk v. Toronto Free Press Publications Ltd. 1995, 126 D.L.R. (4^th), paras 38, 39, 42, 43, 47, 48, 53, 61, 62, 69, 73, 74, 76-80, 98, 99, 103, Book of Authorities, Tab 1

 

Clark v. Canada (1994), 20 C.C.L.T. (2d), pg 241/42, and paras. 4-8, 15, 18, 23, 27, 58, 59-65, Book of Authorities, Tab 6

 

Justice Lofchik?s endorsement record; Affidavit of Plaintif; 04-13797 claim para 141; Motion Factum paras #31 to 85; MMP?s HR rebutal and 3 defence statements with no incompetence allegations (2 after case analysis); CT (see above); Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7

 

14.  The appellant has a valid cause of action against the MAG personally and Her Majesty the Queen similar to the KRP case for intentionally refusing to properly enforce the Code their duty to act to prevent discrimination like the police?s duty to act to prevent crime (CT 220) by mismanagement of the departments under their control per sections 27(2) and 29 para #11 above, and the Appeal courts per MAG Act when MAG appoints Ontario Judges with concerted action of dismissing everything to avoid trial resulting in damages that includes benefits of making me whole per the Code per motion factum paras 2 -5, 16, Issue 3, 24-26, 28, 37-39, 43, 45-49, 53, 54, 58, 59, and 75-79 and CT.  My pleadings against the MAG/Queen are all the paras dealing with the unlawful investigation by Crown defendants and HR facts, and now includes the JR Courts refusing to weigh evidence per their legal duty, approving a written libel, and part of the discovery rule of additional facts of misconduct with all now acting without statutory authority of the MAG Act, OHR?s Code, UN Treaty and Charter (CT pgs 148, 220 (broadly discretion error) -224, 250, 323-43 390-92, 689-700 and 777-899). Justice Lofchik?s order can be set aside per the following:

       

        ?The plaintiffs pleaded that this acquiescence was a violation of s. 5(b) of the MAG Act.  Section 5(b) of the MAG Act states that the Attorney General shall see that the administration of public affairs is in accordance with the law.?

 

        ?alleged OPP failure to enforce the Henco injunction depriving them the benefits of their contracts?

 

        ?(b) shall see that the administration of public affairs is in accordance with the law;   (c) shall superintend all matters connected with the administration of justice in Ontario;?

 

       ?The court refused to summarily dismiss a defamation action as limitation-barred, applying the ?discoverability rule? to the alleged defamation.?

 

       ?An amendment will be granted after commencement of trial unless there is prejudice.?

 

                        KRP, supra, Justice Crane?s endorsement record paras 7, 10, 12, 14, 23, 28, 29, 30, 33, Crown?s Factum, paras 18, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 38, 40, Book of Authorities, Tab 14

 

Ministry of the Attorney General Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.17, s. 5 (b)

                       

Rules of Civil Procedure 21.03 pgs 525 and 531, and 26.01 pg 612

 

Affidavit of Plaintiff; Motion Factum 04 matter para 2, 7, 16, Issue 3, 24, 26, 38, 45, 48, 49, and 53; Article on Bryant as MAG; and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 2, 6, and 8

 

 

15. Justice Lofchik?s paras #36 and #59 that ?allegations based on assumptions and speculations? not to be taken as true is based on ?exception to the Rule? from the Crown?s factum page 11 para 39 of SCC case of Operation Dismantle Inc. of speculation of future event of testing cruise missiles because damages could not be proven.  Violence is done to Rule 21 where allegations of pass events of fabricated insufficient evidence from flawed investigations in 2004 are capable of proof per trial case of Chahal.  The correct Rule 21 test to apply is the ?plain and obvious? per SCC of Hunt v. Carey pages 7 to 15 dated 1990 that includes this Appeal Court?s decision and references Operation Dismantle 1985 case but not the exception to the rule used by Justice Lofchik?s (CT pgs 148, 217, 250, 628-631, 633-660, 704-729, and 777-900).

 

 

Justice Lofchik?s order can be set aside for breaching rule 21, Hunt and KRP cases that state a judge is required by law to read generously with allowance for the plaintiff?s drafting deficincies due to no law training on how to write a proper statement of claim per my factum paras 50 to 55.  His arguments from para #1 to #70 are all due to drafting dificiencies which includes not properly expressing the elements of each tort clearly but rather repeating them throughout the whole claims.  Deputy Judge Nairn?s Rule 21 endorsement dismissing Lyman?s 2004 Rule 21 motion is a proper analysis of the law for same facts against Lyman for Small Claims matter dropped for claim 05-18300.   Justice Lofchik admits to my inadequacies in his endorsement para #30, CT and his May 14^th 2008 order. His order can be set aside for refusing to order amendment of claim for Crown defendants who are joint tortfeasors with Employer defendants which is bias to intervene in the hearing process to favour Crown Defendants, as is refusing to dismiss their motion for delay in filing in 2008 when they received the claims in 2005:

       

     ?We are not, in my opinion, required by the principle enunciated in Inuit Tapirisat, supra, to take as true the appellant?s allegations concerning the possible consequences of the testing of the cruise missile.  The rule that the material facts in a statement of claim must be taken as true for the purpose of determining whether it discloses a reasonable cause of action does not require that allegations based on assumptions and speculations be taken as true.  The very nature of such an allegation is that it cannot be proven to be true by the adduction of evidence.  It would, therefore, be improper to accept that such an allegation is true.  No violence is done to the rule where allegations, incapable of proof, are not taken as proven.?

 

     ?The Plaintiff in this case is unrepresented and there are clearly deficiencies in the drafting of her Statements of Claim.  That being said however, I do not believe it would be appropriate to strike out these claims at this point because of the Plaintiff?s lack of legal training or her inability to express herself concisely.  Reviewing the material that she has provided, I cannot conclude that her claims are ?ridiculous? or "incapable of proof?.  While she may characterize the Defendants? conduct using a variety of terms, in essence she has alleged that her co-workers have acted improperly and as a result, she is entitled to damages.?

 

?I indicated at the outset that the Statement of Claim in both actions, as drafted, cannot stand and should be struck out with leave to deliver fresh statements of claims, which comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure.? 

 

      ?Delay in bringing a Rule 21 motion is a sufficient ground to dismiss the motion, and not merely a matter affecting costs.?

 

       ?I had occasion to affirm this proposition in Operation Dismantle Inc. v R., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 12 Admin. L.R. 16, 13 C.R.R. 287, 18 D.L.R. (4^th) 481, 59 N.R. 1 [Fed.]. At pp. 486-87 I provided the following summary of the law in this area (with which the rest of the court concurred):  ?The law then would appear to be clear.  The facts pleaded are to be taken as proved.  When so taken, the question is do they  disclose a reasonable cause of action ie a cause of action with some chance of success.?    

   

       ?The test remained whether the outcome of the case was ?plain and obvious? or ?beyond reasonable doubt?

      

        ?In my view, these arguments go to form as opposed to substance.  In accordance with the guidelines set out by Dickson J. (as he then was) in Operation Dismantle, supra, the claim must be read as generously as possible, with a view to accommodating any inadequacies in the form of the allegations due to drafting deficiencies.  With this principle in mind, I am satisfied that these pleadings may stand.?

 

        ?I am required to read the Statement of Claim so as to see the substance from the form.?

 

        ?the Court will apply principles that are informed by Charter values of access to justice?

 

Operation Dismantle Inc. v. R. (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4^th) 481 (S.C.C.) pg 9, Book of Authorities, Tab 18

 

Justice Lofchik?s May 14^th 2008 order and August 21^st 2009 endorsement record para 30, 36 and 59; Affidavit of Plaintiff; Statement of claims; Crown?s motion factum page 11 para 39; Plaintiff?s 04 factum para 27, 50 to 57; documents of October 11 cancel motion hearing by Defendants; Deputy Judge Nairn?s endorsement for Lyman?s failed Rule 21 Motion; and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tabs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 10

 

Rules of Civil Procedure 2005, page 525, Tab

 

Hunt, supra, paras 4 (#19 and #20), 8, 9, 21, 23, 26-39, 46, 47, 52, 54 and 57, Book of Authorites, Tab 11

 

 KRP Enterprises Inc, et al and Corporation of Haldimand County, et al, [2007], O.J. No. 114/2006-CP. paras 8, 10, 14, and 30, and MAG?s factum for KRP suit, page 10 para 23, Book of Authorities, Tab 14

 

 

16.  The Minister of Attorney General, Michael Bryant, was a law clerk at the SCC prior to 1999 which is sufficient evidence of apprehension of bias with connections with Law Clerks who decide what is placed before the Judges per the SCC practice rules which was not my appeal application documents or appeal argument per my factum para #37 and #38 but their memorandum resulting in refuse leave to appeal in January 2007.    The SCC practice (CT pgs 890-899) results in abuse of lower courts breaching rule of law per the following:

 

       ?provided with an objective summary and a memorandum prepared by staff lawyers which contain analysis of the issues in order to ferret out the issue of public importance.?

 

       ?We are not a court of error?

 

                        Supreme Court of Canada Practice 2005, Thomson Carswell, pgs 381 and 383, Book of Authorities, Tab

 

Affidavit of Plaintiff; Motion Factum para 37 and 38; SCC Appeal Documents; News Articles on Bryant; CT (see above); Appeal Book and Compendium, Tabs 2, 6, and 8

 

 

PART V ? RELIEF SOUGHT

 

17.  The appellant seeks the order to amend her statement of claim with the Crown Defendants, including the Commission, Mag and Queen, for discriminatory application of the Code, and as joint tortfeasors per Justice Lofchik?s 2008 order for Employer Defendants.  The appellant request the August 21^th 2009 order be voided and cost on a substantial indemnity basis be charged to the Crown respondents.

 

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10.   Justice Lofchik?s order can be set aside for ignoring pleadings in claims discussed in motion hearing for the Tort of Deceit (CT 149-155, 242-43, 868-889) and Constitutional Tort (CT 240, 244-249, 251, 253-324 disability ground, 323-39, 349-89, 404-07, 567-79--89, 609-611) as there is no analysis per endorsement paras #4 and #51 for these causes of actions which means they were sufficiently pleaded.  The Tort of Deceit is per factum para #71 and includes: verbal and written positive misrepresentations one being the Code?s preamble ?everyone is equal? and sections 5 to 10 and HR cases for prima facie complaints; and the second that my complaints were being ?investigated? fairly to mislead me; when there was no fair investigation of every fact which has to include complainant?s witnesses and prima facie collaborative evidence from respondents in reports and JR weighing all the evidence and facts per Ruckpaul JR case;  and the Crown defendants knew I would act upon my rights per the Code resulting in damages. 

 

 

The Constitutional Tort is per motion factum #66, HVK and Longley cases that includes:  breaching the Charter, UN Treaty, and the Code per public policy of ?everyone in Ontario is equal? with measures to codify section 5 to 10 and HR case laws not save under section 1 of the Charter; and Queen/MAG?s refusal to provide a non-discriminatory Human Rights process which the law requires including JR appeals; discrimination per Charter with differential treatment and retaliation by dismissing prima facie complaints  with intentional flawed investigation tactics of all facts in HR complaints to fabricate insufficient evidence in case analyses pleaded in claim 04 matter such as paras 17, 26, 28, 29, 32 (facts at para #36 to #142), and 33, and similarly for 05 matter, and JR Appeals; and additional motive of reprisal for suit #1178/04 filed in Spring against OHRC and Intake Staff before December 2004 reports.  The fact ?unfit to work had I return? in MMP?s case analysis at para #30 is libel and disability discriminatory statement not bald assertion and sufficient for suit per internal report cases at para #6 above.  The Crown defendants have lost jurisdiction and immunity, and can be sued civilly for breaching the Code?s preamble objective per intentional torts with no pleadings of negligence in claim (CT 81, 123, 132, 134-35, 156-62, 195-197, 206-216):

 

         ?the tort of deceit involves a false statement of fact made by the defendant directly to the plaintiff.  This positive misrepresentation can be in either verbal or written form. In the leading case on the tort of deceit Derry v. Peek, the deceit was contained in a company?s written prospectus.? 

 

         ?the defendants were liable for fraud based upon ?active non-disclosure.?

 

?Transit told the media that Dixon was dismissed after a performance review.  That statement was deliberately misleading because it failed to say that it was after a performance review that failed to disclose any cause for dismissal.?

 

        ?Secondly, the Charter may be infringed, not by the legislation itself, but by the actions of a delegated decision-maker in applying it.  In such cases, the legislation remains valid, but a remedy for the unconstitutional action may be sought pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter.? 

 

?In R. v. Swain, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 933, Lamer C.J.C. set out the fundamental approach to s. 15(1) at p. 922 as follows:  The court must first determine whether the claimant has shown that one of the four basic equality rights has been denied (i.e. equality before the law, equality under the law, equal protection of the law and equal benefit of the law).?

 

        ??an adjudicator exercising delegated powers does not have the power to make an order that would result in an infringement of the Charter, and he exceeds his jurisdiction if he does so.? 

 

?the Charter applies and that, ?A Society  and a social worker preparing a Society?s case are obvious instruments of government within the meaning of subsection 32(1).  In my view, a children?s aid society is an arm of the state and where there are breaches of the charter by the Society, it may be held responsible.  Actions of directors or employees as agents of the society are, therefore, subject to scrutiny under the Charter.?

 

Justice Lofchik?s endorsement record paras 4, 51, and 54, Affidavit of Plaintiff, Claims 04-13797 (paras 22, 27, 26, 28, 29, 32, and 33) and 05-18300 (4, 15, 30, 33, 36, 40, and 41), Motion Factum, CT (See above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6

 

Klar, supra, pages 601, 603, 605, Book of Authorities, Tab 13

 

Dixon v. British Columbia Transit (1995), 9 B.C.L.R. (3d), front page, paras 37, 39, 40, 41, 58, 66, 69, and 76-81, Book of Authority, Tab 8

 

Longley v. Minister of Revenue SCC case and (Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, paras 82, 83, 92-95, 97-100, 108- 109, 115-117, 135-37, and 141, Book of Authorities, Tab 16

 

H.V.K., supra, page 2 para 2, para 32, Book of Authorities, Tab 10

 

 

11.  Justice Lofchik?s order can be set aside for fettering discretion as there is no absolute immunity per Westlake, White and Smith for the Commission a Crown Agency under control of MAG per section 27 of the Code when in suit for possessing powers contrary to Code?s purpose ?everyone in Ontario is equal? with personal staff of OHRC, it is only immune if sued by its self in its own rightper Smith and Starline (CT pgs 63-88-91-99, 327-30).  The Court errored that Starline dismiss Major and Commission for absolute immunity per Westlake or that Major had shared immunity with Commission when they were dismissed for failure to serve notice to Crown (CT 88-91, 100-09, 110-112).  Justice Lofchik affirms in his endorsement record paras #45-#54 that I pleaded ?they acted

 

deliberately? with ?quality of the investigation? of unlawful conduct of staff selecting only facts and evidence unfairly with bias to Employers in the reports and not investigating or including all the facts per HR law and refusing to provide me with their evidence into 2010 with improper purpose to discriminate and defame and breach Natural Justice in Bad Faith with malice that  declines jusisdiction per Ruckpaul and Cashin, and for collatoral advantage (CT 142, 162, 194-97). 

 

 

These are questions of motive prompting these Crown Defendants to act as they did for improper purpose to breach natural justice and statute (CT 296-306, 345) and is a question of fact per intentional torts not negligence with no special immunities to be determined at a Trial not Rule 21 motion per SCC?s decision in Roncarrelli, Berardinelli, Nelles, Starline and other cases per factum arguments at paras #35 to #79 (CT 95-328), the UN Treaty and section 5(2) and 23 of the Proceedings Against the Crown.  These authorities give right to sue for intentional conduct with other improper motives of collusion, discrimination and defamation with respondents that is contrary to public purpose in Code?s preamble, section 36, and Charter which invalidates Justice Lofchik?s argument at #49 and #50 base on Lacosse and Oren Nimelman and JR when my claims are not similar (CT 206-207, 234-36, 572-73, 592-99, 603-05, 626-27, 640-49, 706, 745-48) per the following:   

 

        ?The Commission is responsible to the Minister for the administration of this Act.?

 

?All provincial and federal human rights legislation is relevant to the interpretation of one human rights statute.?

 

        ?Instead, the courts examine the relationship between that body and the Crown, as represented by the ministers of the Crown.  If that relationship is one of control by a   minister, then the controlled body is an agent of the Crown.?

     

  ?Section 5 of the Public Authorities Protection Act makes it clear that the Crown can be liable in tort if its servants or agents have committed a tort.  It is also clear that Crown agencies are included under the Act.? 

 

        ?public bodies must not use their powers for purposes incompatible with the purposes envisaged by the statutes?

 

      ?It would appear on the basis of the authorities cited that, in general terms public   officers are entitled to no special immunities or privileges when they act beyond the powers which are accorded to them by law in their official capacities.  It would follow, then, that where a public officer, a servant for the Crown exceeds the powers of his office or acts improperly in fraud of his duties and powers, or acts with malice in the discharge of his duties, he does not have immunity from civil suit and where, by reason of such excess of power or improper motive, he causes damage he may be civilly liable in damages.  This, indeed, seems clear as far at least as it may concern public servants who act in administrative capacities.?

 

      ?should be resolved in favour of the person whose right of action is being truncated?

 

       ?proceeding in tort in respect of such act or omission may be brought against that servant or agent or the personal representatitve of the servant or agent.?

 

       ?23.  Where this Act conflicts with any other Act, this Act governs?

 

        ?To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or enterprise.?

 

        ?serious and obvious errors also oust jusidiction and hence remove the immunity?

 

 ?The Court allows Cashin?s application and refers the matter back to the  Canadian Human Rights Commission because Cashin was not afforded the   opportunity to know the specific evidence against her and to answer it.  The  Court finds that the requirements of natural justice were not met.?

 

?its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.?

 

?There was no need for giving a notice of action as required by art. 88 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the act done by the defendant was quite beyond the scope of any function or duty committed to him?

 

The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, pgs preamble, 1, 2, 43, 53, 58-60, 62-64, 67, 68, 74, 140-42, 146, 149, 172, 184, 191, 201, 302, 359, 361, 447, 448, and 468; and The 2009 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, pg 2 and 3, Book of Authorities, Tab 2

 

Starline Entertainment Centre Inc. v. Ciccarelli, supra, pg 1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 16, Book of Authorites, Tab 22

 

Crown Agency Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.48

 

Proceedings Against the Crown Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.27, ss. 1, 5 (1) and (2), and 23

 

UN Treaty, surpa, Article 2 (e), Book of Authority, Tab 25

 

Klar, supra, pg 289, Book of Authority, Tab 13

 

Roseann Cashin v. Canadian Human Rights Commission (1984), 5 C.H.H.R. D/2234, paras summary, 18875-78, Book of Authority, Tab 4

 

Ruckpaul v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC149 (CanLII), analysis pgs 7 to 11 particularly paras 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52-58, 62-71 and 75, Book of Authorities, Tab 20

 

Roncarelli, supra, pgs 123, 140, 141-43, 155-59, 167, 169, and 184-86, Book of Authorities, Tab 19

 

Statement of Claim 04-13797 para #24, Motion Factum 04 matter paras #35-43 (42 JR), and 44-79, CT (See above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tabs 3, 4, and 6

 

 

12.  Justice Lofchik?s order can be set aside for error in law at his paras #30, #45, #51-54, #57, #62 and #66 alleging: 1) that complainants do not have right to thorough investigation of all facts (CT pgs 754-68) or suit for improper purpose of breach of statute with unlawful discretion without authority or intent of Code; 2) that ?obstruction of justice? and ?breach of natural justice? were pleaded as causes of actions in themselves rather than to support torts (CT pgs 258-261, 296-99, 605-607, 620-25, 706); and (3) that my pleadings for intentional torts that includes words of deliberate conduct of fabrication of insufficient evidence, sham investigation, slanting the case analysis, distorting and imaging the truth, controlling witnesses, concealing evidence, colluding, defaming, ?targeted malice?, obstruction of justice and breach of Code is the law of negligence, can only be question through a JR, are inflamatory and not allowed when they are appropriate words to plead for deliberate conduct per conspiracy cases of Chahal, SCC case of Hunt and others.  The pleadings at para #20 in 2004 claim denote unlawful and bad faith conduct equated with dishonesty for refusal to acknowledge prima facie facts and evidence sufficient for improper purpose for abuse of office per SCC cases of Roncarelli and Longley, Ruckpaul at para #8 above and HVK case para #56, and is not negligently  making innocent mistake.  I pleaded them as the deliberate and improper conduct for the cause of action of Misfeasance of Public Office (Ct pgs 124-189-224, 232-393, 394-407, 408-420, 789), Discrimination and other intentional torts (CT pgs 135-37, 163-64, 640-49, 779-889) allowed per Odhavji similar to breach of statute (CT pg 394).  

 

 

Justice Lofchik agrees that I pleaded the intentional torts per his para #51 and #54 with ?they acted deliberately?; and he intentionally ignores my pleadings with motives at para 20 in 04 matter and para #6 and #31 in 05 matter that I had filed suit against commission and intake staff #1178/04 in Spring 2004 and received case analyses in December 2004 sufficient for reprisal and collateral advantage motive, and campaign to induce mental illness of delusional disorder and/or depression which are sufficient pleadings per intentional tort law (CT 704-729, 754-68, 793-818).  Justice Lofchik is breaching the authority of SCC cases of Roncarelli and Longley similar to mine in that the Crown knowingly misleads complainant as to the legality of prima facie complaints by fabricating insufficient evidence in case analyses, and I pleaded at para #24 ?targeted malice? with reckless disregard for the truth (CT 877-878) per Uni-Jet all sufficient per motion factum para #47 to #79 that allows suits against the Crown and Justice Lofchik?s order can be set aside per the following: 

 

        ?I plead that the facts as stated in Shannon Meadows-Lee from the investigation office at the commission in her December 2004 MMP case analysis are injurious falsehoods and the tort of deceit from the commission colluding with now MMP Limited to protect Watts Reprisal campaign from being exposed by concealing    evidence and controlling witnesses who would provide adverse outcome to the facts presented in these case analyses.?

     

        ?The concealment of evidence is the concealment of the material facts in this statement listed from #36 to #142.?

 

        ?a conspiracy to injure me with a mental illness of the type of ?people out to get me?

       

       #20 ?fraudulently, deceitfully or negligently suppressing, distorting and

        misrepresenting the results of medical and scientific research on the disease-causing effects of asbestos.? 

 

        ?Just as a public officer who breaches a statute might be liable for negligence, so too might a public officer who breaches a statute be liable for misfeasance in a public office.  Saskatchewan Wheat Pool would only be relevant to this motion if the appellants had pleaded no more than a failure to discharge a statutory obligation.?

 

 ?In light of the allegation that the Chief?s failure to segregate the officers was delibersate, this is not a sufficient basis on which to strike the pleading.?

 

        ?Malice has been described as ?improper purpose?.  That it has a wider meaning than spite, ill-will or a spirit of vengeance, and includes any other improper purpose, such as to gain a private collateral advantage.?

 

        ?bad faith? is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with a furtive design or ill will.?  

 

        ?Persons exercising such quasi-judicial powers?in the absence of fraud, collusion or malice, are not liable to any civil action at the suit of any person aggrieved by their decisions.?

       

        ?Minister of National Revenue was liable for the tort when officials in its department knowingly misled the plaintiff by refusing to acknowledge the legality of a tax avoidance scheme that the plaintiff had concocted.  The court held that the defendant had therefore knowingly acted outside of its statutory authority where damage to the plaintiff was probable satisfying the second form of the tort.?

 

?Good faith? in this context?means carrying out the statute according to its intent and purpose; it means good faith in acting with a rational appreciation of that intent and purpose and not with an improper intent and alien purpose?

 

Statement of Claim #04-131797 paras 6-10, 13, 20-22, 24-26, 28, 30-33, 118-140, and #05-18300 paras 3, 6, 10-16, 22, 24, and 30-45, Motion Factum 04 matter para #47 to 79, and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 3, 4, and 6

 

Hunt v. Carey Canada Inc., [1990] 2 S.C.R. 959 (S.C.C.), paras 4 (#19 and #20), 8, 9, 21, 23, 26-39, 46, 47, 52, 54 and 57, Book of Authorities, Tab 11

 

Odhavji, supra, para 31 and 37, Book of Authorities, Tab 17

 

Starline, supra, pg 12, Book of Authorities, Tab 22

 

The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, supra, page 302, Book of Authority, Tab 2

 

Roncarelli, supra, pgs 123, 140, 141-43, 155-59, 167, 169, and 184-86, Book of Authorities, Tab 19

 

Longley, supra, pg 446, paras 82, 83, 85, and 86, Book of Authorities, Tab 16

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7.   Justice Lofchik order can be set aside as facts in HR complaints and the case analyses reports are sufficient for full particulars for all torts per Roncarelli, Ashley, Deery, Longley, Botiuk, Hunt, Deputy Judge Nairn, and rule of civil procedure 25.06 (2) and (8) and I requested adding other facts allowed per HVK with a low threshold (CT 191-94, 217, 294-99, 581, 615-20, 640-49, 737-40, 789-796).  These HR facts pleaded were allegedly investigated and have been proven in similar HR cases therefore they are not baldly pleaded.  The Charter, Code, UN treaty and SCC clearly states the Crown does have a duty to the public policy of ?everyone is equal? to proceed with every prime facie complaint in a ?non-discriminatory manner? to Tribunal per factum arguments for 04 matter at paras #47, 48, 51, 54, 57-60, 62, 63, 65-68, 70-76, 78, and 79, and similarly for 05 matter that makes all complainants equal so long as the prohibited ground forms one of the reasons such as MMP?s rebuttal ?long absense?. 

 

 

The Code and SCC cases at para #6 invalidates the Crowns section 34 cases of Way and Gismondi on discretion when complaint is prima facie made out per the Code: repetitive of sexual harassment, exposure to any form of pornography or sexual representation or sex solicitation, failure of six elements HR?s test, insurance plan that limits benefits for mental disabilities (MMP, and Lyman), firing employee without making inquiries and accommodation (MMP), perceived disability discimination, and firing after making internal complaints for reprisal.  The Crown defendants are personally suable for acting in an discriminatory manner of differential treatment by fabricating insufficient evidence refusing to look at all facts with intentional flawed investigation and JR into 2010 sufficient for improper purpose that oust jurisdiction and immunity not protected by Charter section 1 (CT 124-26, 237, 745-48, 857).  My pleadings of facts show that respondents made clear statement concerning one of the grounds which forms one of the reasons for their conduct per the code unlawfully ignored by Crown to defame me with incompentency falsehoods not baldy pleaded per Deep para 46 and the following:

       

      ?For example, a party might state simply that the party was defamed by the   other party without stating what the other party said that was defamatory.?

 

      ?A prima facie case of discrimination?is one which covers the allegations made and which, if they are believed, is complete and sufficient to justify a verdict in the complainant?s favour in the absence of an answer from the respondent employer.?     

 

       ?the fact that ?disability? played some role in the decision taints the entire decision.?

 

       ?the law is clear that the prohibitive ground of discrimination need not be the only reason for the action taken, so long as it forms one of the reasons.?

 

?The Tribunal holds that discrimination occurred when the sole director and officer of the respondents, Albright Drycleaners Ltd., fired Ms. Williams-Wilson without making inquiries into the status of her mental state and without giving her the chance to request accomodation.?

  

Rules of Civil Procedure 25.06(2)

 

Deep v. Ontario, {2004} O.J. No. 2734, paras 20, 22, 35, 44, 46, 57, 68, and 83, Book of Authorities, Tab 7

 

Starline, supra, pg 14 (25.06(8)), Book of Authorities, Tab 22

 

                        The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, pg 201, 43, 59 and 361, Book of Authorities, Tab 2

 

Margaretta Williams-Wilson v. Albright Drycleaners Ltd (1997), 32 C.H.R.R., summary paragraph, Book of Authority, Tab 27

 

International Union of Elevator Constructors, Local 50 v. Otis Canada Inc., 2004 CanLII 49773 (ON L.R.B.), paras 47, 54, 60, 61, 62, 66, 77, and 79, Book of Authorities, Tab 12

                       

Statement of Claims #04 paras 8 and 110, motion factum (04 matter para 27, 56, and 58), OHRC documents (showing Respondents collaborative evidence forming one of the reasons), Deputy Judge?s Nairns endorsement record for Lyman?s failed rule 21 2004 motion), and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tabs 3, 6, 7, and 10

 

 

8.  Justice Lofchik?s order can be set aside because the discretionary power to not deal with a complaint is per the Code s. 36 after an investigation not included in his bias analysis at #44 from Crown?s s. 34 case of Way in their factum at page 9 para #30 and #31 (see first quotation below) with changed words from this case (second quotation) which is intervening to favour the Crown.  The Way and Gismondi cases with duty under s. 34 to not proceed to investigations are not similar to my case and therefore is an illegitimate reason for dismissing investigated complaints under s. 36 by Crown proving intentional unlawful conduct and acting without authority.  Justice Lofchik errored in his endorsement at #60 as the Code under s. 34 and 36 does not include statement of discretion per endorsement record and Way, nor to breach stare decisis of sections 5 to 10 and Human Rights Case laws similar to my prima facie complaints, or deprived complainants of thorough and full investigation of every fact with lots of fundamental omissions explicitely disregarding facts (CT pgs 130-32, 160-63, 165-185, 199-209, 218, 263--275-286, 294-99, 345, 363-89, 393-96, 640-49, 754-768) per Odhavji a non Human Rights case not similar to my claim with HR violations; and requires non-discriminatory reason per #6 above, and JR courts to weigh the evidence and order production of investigation documents in question when challenged by complainants.  All are facts of intentional not negligent conduct by all Crown Defendants acting beyond powers of the Code?s preamble into 2010 per the following after first three quotations:

 

?It is respectfully submitted that the legislation clearly establishes the discretionary nature of the Commission?s powers.  In fact, the Court has recognized that the Commission is not under a public duty to proceed with every complaint placed before it.?

 

        ?The Commission is not under a duty to investigate every complaint?

 

?34. (1) (b)  the subject-matter of the complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;?

 

?36 (2) Notice of decision not to appoint inquiry ? Where the Commission decides not to refer the subject-matter of a complaint to the Tribunal, it shall advise the complainant and the person complained against in writing of the decision and the reasons therefore?

 

?its duty is to decide if, under the provisions of the Act, an inquiry is warranted having regard to all the facts.?

 

?an investigation had to be at least thorough and neutral for the Commission to have a fair basis on which to evaluate?

 

?that where the completeness of the investigation or report is challenged, the underlying investigation documents are relevant and subject to production?      

 

        ?If the investigation is flawed to the point where a court can reasonably conclude the evidence reported by the investigator is incomplete or inadequate, the court must intervene.?

 

?She failed to interview the applicant nor any of her witnesses.  The Commission realized this was a flaw and asked the investigator to interview the applicant?s witnesses.?

 

?Furthermore, two supplemental witness statements, dated February 15 and 16, 2001, from CIC?s main witnesses in response to questions put by the investigator to CIC were not disclosed.?

 

?Ms. Huneault made a clear statement concerning one of the grounds upon which the applicant based her discrimination and harassment claims.  However, the investigator failed to address this issue any further in his report.  This omission might constitute a ?fundamental? omission.?

 

                        Affidavit of Plaintiff, Claims 04-13797 and 05-18300, Motion Factum of the Respondents pg 9 para #30 and #31, Motion Factum 04 matter paras #30 to #79, CT (see above), OHRC documents, Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7

                       

Way v. Ontario (Human Rights Commission), [2003] O.J. No. 5099 (S.C.J.) at para 7, Book of Authorities, Tab 26

 

                       The 2005 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, supra, pgs 172, and 184,  Book of Authorities, Tab 2

 

Ruckpaul v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 149 (CanLII), analysis pgs 7 to 11 particularly paras 42, 45-50, 52-58, 62-71 and 75, Book of Authorities, Tab 20

 

 

9.  Justice Lofchik?s order and the Crown?s case analyses reports can be set aside for fettering discretion acting outside of their jurisdiction when their decision is inconsistent with all equality laws at paras #6 to #8 above infringing the Charter and ?access to justice? and breaches the principle of stare decisis by refusing to consider all of the appellant?s binding authority.  This includes joint tortfeasors doctrine that no judge can ignore per motion arguments that invalidates the Crown?s authorities and is intervening in hearing to favour the Crown institutional bias when MAG appoints Ontario Judges like Justice Lochik per CT ( pgs 161, 179, 218-24, 296, 323, 564, 571, 581, 588-89, 620, 749-58, 772-780, 786-87, 793, 817, 825-28, 857) and the following:

 

       ?A judge should not give a judgment contrary to that of another judge of the same court unless at least one of the following situations exists:  (1) subsequent decisions  have affected the validity of the impugned judgment; (2) it is shown that some  some binding authority in case law or some relevant statute was not considered;?

 

        ?The fundamental rule in the exercise of discretion is that the choices made must be consistent with the purpose of the statute and within its wording.?

 

        ?When officials rule out options that the law requires them to consider they are said said to be fettering their discretion.?

 

        ?If the official considering the application ignored the criteria that he was required to apply in making the decision and decided to deny access to the services, the individual might be able to successfully challenge the decision in the courts on the grounds that the official was acting outside his jurisdiction.?

 

        ?A tribunal may appear to have a built-in bias where one of the parties that appears before it is a government department that approves its budget, appoints its members, provides its staff, or exercises control in other ways that may suggest that the department has influence over the tribunal?s decisions.?  This kind of built-in bias is called institutional bias.?

 

?The kinds of activities, conduct, interests, relationships, and associations of a decision maker that may give rise to an appearance of bias includes:  intervenes in the hearing process in a way that persistently favours one party over another.?       

           

Justice Lofchik?s May 14^th 2008 order, Affidavit of Plaintiff, Deputy Judge Mongeon?s Endorsement Record for file #1178/04 para 21 and 28, and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 1, 2 and 10

 

Administrative Law:  Principals and Advocacy, pg 5, 50, 51, 54, 58, 68, 93 and 94, Book of Authorities, Tab 23

 

 

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PART IV ? THE ISSUES AND THE LAW

 

ISSUE 1:  The Court Below erred in law applying the Crown?s definition of discretion based on case law and broadly not narrowly per the OHR Code which shows that the Crown is applying discretion wihout authority of Statute per preamble that ?everyone in Ontario is equal? resulting in fraud, with measures to codify per sections 5 to 10 and prima facie HR case laws similar to appellant, with balance, fair and thorough investigations and JR of all of the facts that includes providing appellant investigation documents per her request and interviewing her witnesses.  Therefore the Crown is acting without the authority of the Charter and United Nations (?UN?) Treaty per the SCC?s decisions which includes no imunity for HR damages against any institution or organization. As a result the Crown have lost or decline jurisdiction and immunity, and can be sued per intentional torts pleaded, and discretion and immunity does not protect the Crown for intentional torts such as Conspiracy and Defamation per joint tortfeasers legal principal and SCC case authorities.

 

ISSUE 2:  The Court Below erred in law for Rule 21 analysis by completely ignoring the ?plain and obvious test? that facts are to be taken as true, allowance for inadequacies due to drafting deficiencies for unrepresented litigant with no law training, and refusal to dismiss the Crown?s Motion per Rule 21 failure to file motion on timely basis.  That this test includes the pleadings of the Employers? facts in HR complaints, OHRC intentionally flawed investigation and reports pleaded sufficiently and with particularity per CT which can be reviewed in Civil Courts for tort damages against the Crown not in JR Courts and is not an abuse of process for re-litigation per Crown?s case HVK.  The Intentional Torts such as Misfeasance of Public Office allows the public legitimate right to Civil Courts against the Crown for abuses of how they did their job including in Bad Faith resulting in damages.

 

ISSUE 3:   The Court Below erred in law by breaching rule of law by misapplying the common law principle of ?stare decisis? by ignoring all of the appellant?s stare decisis authorities including the UN Treaty that he is bound by that voids all of the Crown Defendants? authorities including the immunity for Commission, and this order is Unconstitutional, instituional bias, and fettering discretion to protect the Crown defendants not save by section 1 of the Charter.  The MAG, Michael Bryant,  can be sued for various intentional torts per KRP case in his own right for violation of s. 5(b) of the MAG Act and the Code; and the Commission is responsible to this Minister for the administration of the Code per s. 27(2) therefore controlled test met for Crown Agency.  The Queen can be added to suit for continuance of action and now again with Justice Lofchik?s conduct.

 

 

6.  The discretion that is given to all of the Crown defendants (CT 220-224, 566-71), Justice Lofchik and all Courts is narrowly and per Charter ?access to justice? with allowances for drafting deficiencies to unrepresented litigants with no law training how to write proper claim (CT 550-51), and the Code preamble that ?everyone in Ontario is equal? with measures to codify section 5 to 10 to eliminate discrimination in Ontario as

great as the UN treaty (CT 160-162, 329-39, 844-45, 848-857) which includes judges and legislation abolishing all discrimintarory laws, practices, orders and reports that infringe the Charter and UN Treaty (CT 745-48, 848-857, 863).   Justice Lofchik?s order can be set aside per his arguments para #51 to #56 and #61 to 63 when per his agreement the facts pleaded is based on personal knowledge of facts in HR?s complaints? Employment events (CT 192-93, 749-757, 758, 759-788), the facts from the Crown?s entire conduct up to trial of intentional flawed investigation tactics per reports with regards to all the facts in complaints, and new facts of flawed JR appeals by refusing to weigh all the evidence and facts (CT 81, 443) and abide by sections 5 to 10 of the Code which are sufficient facts not bald allegations of misconduct for the intentional causes of actions pleaded and improper purpose for Misfeasance of Public Office, that removes jurisdiction and immunity (CT 194-96, 345, 572-73, 615-620, 640-649, 668-729, 740).  Justice Lofchik errorred at para #52, and #53 when he stated apart from the HR internal reports there is insufficient facts for intentional torts so that he can claim I pleaded no facts only bald assertions at #54 when I only need the facts of HR reports and complaints for questions of fact to show how the defendants abused their job resulting in damages sufficient when defendants have already pleaded in response which internal documents was sufficient as facts for tort of deceit in Derry case (CT 868-889) and for defamation/libel in Botiuk SCC (CT 742, 777-788, 831-35) and Longley case, for Constitutional Tort in HVK case, and report for Misfeasance of Public Office in SCC case of Roncarelli to refuse license by a Commission. 

 

 

Justice Lofchik errored that HR complaints litigated in JR HR?s jurisdiction where the court refused to weigh evidence (CT pg 443, 891-899) is a claim for damages against the Crown (CT pgs 187-479) therefore abuse of process to litigate same facts in claim in civil jurisdiction at para #64 and is an attempt to circumvent intentional torts and legitimate rights to civil suit that includes statutory breaches when Crown acts in bad faith causing damages and that my claim is not similar to Deep v. Ontario (CT pgs 186, 604-05, 714, 725, 779-793, 803-04).  In Court Justice Lofchik clearly stated ?if you?re seeking damages for torts?it?s in a proceeding such as this and not judicial review? (CT pg 604), therefore this claim is not abuse of process or relitigation of same issues per endorsement paras #64, 60, #62, #64 and #45 raised in JR for discrimination damages since the Crown were not respondents for those damages.  These claims are my first civil suits against the Crown for fundamental omissons where a Trial judge will make a determination of the facts in HR complaints and reports by weighing the facts with evidence, witnesses and cross examinations, and is allowed for civil tort law per Kulyk, Starline, HVK, Botiuk, Hunt, Longley, Roncarelli, Odhavji, and SCC (CT 888-889, 897-98.  Justice Lofchik?s unconstitutional one sided endorsement record refusing to be bound by the UN Treaty per SCC is institutional bias of intervening in hearing to favour the Crown (CT 581) and evidence that the MAG personally and the Queen Her Majesty refuses to administrate justice in Ontario in accordance with the UN Treaty and equality laws for women through the HR and Courts jurisdictions per my factum arguments paras #30 to #79 and Court Transcript.  Justice Lofchik?s order is inconsistent with the purpose of the UN Treaty, Charter, and the Code and all are acting without authority, therefore the order and HR reports are of no force or effect per the following:

 

        ?WHEREAS recognition of the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world and is in accord with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as proclaimed by the United Nations; AND WHEREAS it is public policy in Ontario to recognize the dignity and worth of every person and to provide for equal rights and opportunities without discrimination that is contrary to law, and having as its aim the creation of a climate of understanding and mutual respect for the dignity and worth of each person so that each person feels a part of the community and able to    contribute fully to the development and well-being of the community and the Province;

       

       ?The Ontario Human Rights Code should receive an interpretation which advances the broad purposes set out in its preamble.? 

      

       ?Rights should be interpreted broadly and legislated exceptions to the exercise of these rights should be interpreted narrowly.?

 

       ?Justice Sopinka in the case of Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board) in 1996 argued this point that Human Rights Boards are bound by stare decisis because human rights are an equality issue?

     

       ?In this case the question of the motive which prompted the council to act as it did is a question of fact and is one which should be decided at trial.  There is a developing tort consisting of the infliction of damage by the deliberate abuse of public office or authority?which by necessary implication permits a plaintiff?if it sustains damages as a result of such an abuse, to come to a common law court for its remedy and not necessarily rely on the remedies afforded through judicial review of such action.?

 

?There are numerous previous legal proceedings relating to the children, including the Crown wardship case brought under the Child and Family Services Act, the custody applications brought under the Children?s Law Reform Act, the Director?s review under s. 68 of the Child and Family Services Act, the costs hearing, the stay motion, the appeal  and an application for judicial review.  None of these proceedings involved claims for damages.?

 

        ?Although the defendant possessed the power to deprive certain persons from participating in the election, he did not have the power to do so for an improper purpose.?

 

?the mere fact that the alleged misconduct also constitutes a breach of statute is   insufficient to exempt the officer from civil liability.?

 

        ?In the leading case on the tort of deceit Derry v. Peek, the deceit was contained in a company?s written prospectus?

 

?all those who participated in or were responsible for the original publication and its distribution must be joined as joint tortfeasors in the original cause of action.?

 

?Malice in the proper sense is simply acting for a reason and purpose knowingly foreign to the administration, to which was added here the element of intentional punishment by what was virtually vocation outlawry.?

 

         ? (b)  To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women; (c)   To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination; (d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public authorities and       institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation; (e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or   enterprise; (f)  To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women?

                       

        ?The Constitution is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with its provisions is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.  It is thus impossible to interpret legislation conferring discretion as conferring a power to infringe the Charter, unless, of course, that power is expressly conferred or necessarily implied.  Such an interpretation would require this Court to declare the legislation to be of no force or effect, unless it could be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.  It follows that an adjudicator, who exercises delegated powers, does not have the power to make an order that would result in an infringement of the

        Charter.? 

 

        ?As was said in Oakes, supra, at p.136, among the underlying values essential to our free and democratic society are ?the inherent dignity of the human person? and ?commitment to social justice and equality?.  Especially in light of Canada?s ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), and commitment therein to protect, inter alia, the right to work in its various dimensions found in Article 6 of that treaty, it cannot be doubted that the objective in this case is a very important one.  In Reference Re Public Service  Employee Relations Act (Alta.), supra, I had occasion to say at p. 349:  The content of Canada?s international human rights obligations is, in my view, an important indicia of the meaning of the ?full benefit of the Charter?s protection?.  I believe that the Charter should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in international human rights documents which Canada has ratified.?  

 

        ?This Court has repeatedly held that once the state does provide a benefit, it is obliged to do so in a non-discriminatory manner.?

 

       ?In the present case, the government has manifestly failed to demonstrate that it had a reasonable basis for concluding that a total denial of medical interpretation services for the deaf constituted a minimum impairment of their rights.?

 

        ?the government has not made a ?reasonable accommodation? of the appellants? disability? and ?it has not accommodated the appellants? needs to the point of ?undue hardship?

           

        ?5(i)  shall superintend all matters connected with judicial offices;?

                       

The 2005 and 2009 Annotated Ontario Human Rights Code, pgs 1, 2, 3, 140, and 201, Book of Authorities, Tab 2

 

                        Kulyk v. Toronto (City) Board of Education (1996), 24 C.C.E.L (2d) 63, para 29, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41 and 42 (Sopinka J, 1996 S.C.R. Mooring v. Canada (National Parole Board), 50-55, Book of Authorities, Tab 15

 

Starline Entertainment Centre Inc. V. Ciccarelli, [1995] 25 O.R. (3d), 765, pg 14, Book of Authorities, Tab 22

 

H.V.K. v. Children?s Aid Society of Haldimand-Norfolk, [2003] O.J. No 1572, paras 15, 20, 25, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33, 55, 56, and 57, Book of Authorities, Tab 10

 

Odhavji Estate v. Woodhouse, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263, paras 15, 16, 18 20, 21, 24, 37, 31, 40, and 41, Book of Authorities, Tab 17

 

Klar, ?Tort Law?, 2003, Thomson Carswell, pages 289, 295, 601, 603, 605 and 682-3, Book of Authorities, Tab 13

 

Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [1959] S.C.R. 121, pgs 123, 140, 141-43, 155-59,  167, 169, and 184-86, Book of Authorities, Tab 19

The UN Treaty the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and its Optional Protocol 2000 Article 2 (b) to (f), pg 5 Book of Authority, Tab 25

 

Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, pgs 2, 18 and 19, Book of Authorities, Tab 21

 

Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), paras 58, 73, 85, 87, 94, Book of Authorities, Tab 9

 

Ministry of the Attorney General Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.17, section 5(i)

 

JL?s endorsement record, Motion Factums 04 matter paras 3, 5, Issue 3, #30 to #79 and 05 matter paras #33 to #89, Canadian Press Article, and CT (see above), Appeal Book and Compendium, Tab 1, 6, and 8

 

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